Zur Seitenansicht
 

Titelaufnahme

Titel
Against the speaker-intention theory of demonstratives
VerfasserGauker, Christopher
Erschienen in
Linguistics and Philosophy, Amsterdam, 2018, Jg. 2018, S. 1-21
ErschienenAmsterdam : Springer Netherlands, 2018
SpracheEnglisch
DokumenttypAufsatz in einer Zeitschrift
Schlagwörter (EN)Demonstratives / Reference / Speakers intention / Context-relativity
ISSN1573-0549
URNurn:nbn:at:at-ubs:3-11454 Persistent Identifier (URN)
DOI10.1007/s10988-018-9239-x 
Zugriffsbeschränkung
 Das Werk ist frei verfügbar
Dateien
Against the speaker-intention theory of demonstratives [0.42 mb]
Links
Nachweis
Klassifikation
Zusammenfassung (Englisch)

It is commonly supposed that an utterance of a demonstrative, such as “that”, refers to a given object only if the speaker intends it to refer to that object. This paper poses three challenges to this theory. First, the theory threatens to beg the question by defining the content of the speakers intention in terms of reference. Second, the theory makes psychologically implausible demands on the speaker. Third, the theory entails that there can be no demonstratives in thought.

Notiz
Statistik
Das PDF-Dokument wurde 1 mal heruntergeladen.
Lizenz
CC-BY-Lizenz (4.0)Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz