Traditional concepts of personhood of western philosophy often refer to rational capabilities such as the capacity for reason and morality, or reflexive self-awareness, as foundation for an individual moral status and the correlating moral obligations. This is opposed to the experience of having special moral obligations, for example towards children, people with special needs or non-human animals. All those groups are in danger of falling out of view due to the ratiocentric reductionism. Current discourse about the concepts of vulnerability and approval are therefore an important addition: On the one hand they can decrease the selectivity of classic moral philosophical conceptions by emphasising the universally shared need as anchor for morality, instead of using competences. On the other hand, in that way they can also justify positive obligations of care for beings in need. However, this addition needs a further addition for the following three reasons: Firstly, it depends on contingent acknowledgement of vulnerability in the given ethos, without itself having sufficient normative criteria. Secondly, it presumes shared, but not singular needs and demands. And, thirdly, it does not explain why one should be motivated to act on the obligation, because it presumes allocation structures instead of specific encounters. A revised phenomenology of the body, whose implications for moral theoretic questions are outlined in the following article, seems appropriate.